Bush Lied, Boy Scouts Died
July 31, 2005
This takes the cake for best satire of the day. Hands down. Here’s a sample:
President Bush was scheduled to meet with a large contingent of Boy Scouts at their National Jamboree on Tuesday. Boy Scouts lined the field waiting to hear from the President, but the President never came. President Bush instead used his magic powers and created a thunderstorm which in turn canceled his trip.
What thunderstorms asks an astute reader at Democratic Underground. What thunderstorms indeed.
What about the poor Boy Scouts you ask? Over 300 fell ill to dehydration, fatigue, mertibadgeitis and lightheadedness. Where was President Bush? He was sitting comfortable in the White House singing ‘I will Survive’ by Gloria Gaynor.
Wait until you read the links to Democratic Underground. These people actually think Bush made up the thunderstorm. What a bunch of dimwitted idiots.
A Gift for Jane
July 31, 2005
This picture comes from one of our loyal readers. Thanks, Emmett.
Resignation
July 30, 2005
Some of you know that for the last 3 years, I have been an administrator at deviantART.com, which is the largest art community on the internet.
I stepped down today because the CEO of the company, in my opinion, doesn’t have the faintest idea of what honor and integrity are. Due to the fact that comments and journal posts are being removed by the administration, I have chosen to post my resignation here as well. This means I am now without a “job” of any type save my freelance editing, but I retain my honor, and to me that’s all that matters.
Update: Scott Jarkoff, my former boss and mentor, has finally made a statement. Leave some support. The last five years of his life were devoted nearly night and day to making that community what it is. It’s a damn shame that it’s gotten to this point. Anyway, my resignation letter follows.
I have been at this site for over 4 years, and I’ve been an admin in various capacities for most of that time. There are few people still on staff that were there when I started. Sadly, today I will add my name to the list of those stepping down.
I am a firm believer in integrity. I’ve made my share of mistakes; some publicly, some not. But I do believe in transparency: Be who you say you are, do what you say you plan to do, and if you screw up, have the maturity and honor to say it and apologize to those you hurt. For a long time, this site and its management have not been able to claim any of those qualities.
As someone who has a great deal of management experience, I can tell you that a good leader respects those who work for them. They understand the sentence “A happy employee is a productive one.†An environment where people are kept in the dark only breeds mistrust. Without mutual trust in a working relationship, success is simply not possible.
There are a lot of rumors and conjecture going around, and the truth is, very few people KNOW the entire truth. I can tell you in all honesty that I am one of those people. I have been watching this story unfold for a very long time, and those who were involved included me for the purpose of information consistency. I have seen the emails going back and forth, I have seen the documentation that exists.
Rather than make this journal a tell-all (and open myself up for possible legal action for violation of my non-disclosure agreement), I will simply say this:
It is my opinion that the management of this company, for the most part, lacks the most common qualities of integrity and honor. The focus of the CEO’s vision is not one of community or art, but rather commerce and capital. While these are not in and of themselves bad things, when they take over what really matters it becomes a problem and corrupts everything in its path.
Unfortunately, I must also admit that in a sense, I have fallen victim to it as well. I have been appalled for months at the information that was made available to me through various channels, and yet I did nothing. Why? Because after 3 years, I was finally receiving a paycheck from DA. Not a large one, but money nonetheless. At the time, I was (and still am) planning a move across the country, and every dollar came in handy. It was wrong, and I believe I failed to do the right thing, way back when I first knew what the right thing was. I attempted to publicly stay out of the mess because I had a job to do.
It’s been said that “All that is necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.†While obviously this is on a much smaller scale, the saying holds true. By remaining a part of the staff, I am in essence saying “I support what is happening.†I can no longer sit by and watch the double standards, the misinformation, and the outright lies that are being told. The time has come for me to stand up and say “This is wrong, and I will not be a part of it anymore.â€
And so, I will say goodbye. Thank you to those who have been friends to me over the last few years. You know who you are, and you are welcome to pop by and say hello. My email is kit.jarrell@gmail dot com. To the MN@, I know some of you will follow me, and for that I thank you. To those who stay, I respect your decision and apologize that I could not get a hold of you privately first.
I am sorry I didn’t stand up sooner.
Vandals After Military Funeral
July 30, 2005
Did you all hear about this? Vandals tore American flags out of the yard of a dead soldier’s family, stuffed them under a car in their driveway, and then set the whole thing on fire! Where did this happen? America’s heartland…
FAIRFIELD, Ohio (AP) - Vandals tore American flags out of the yard of a dead soldier’s family the day after his funeral, then set a car on fire, authorities said.
Army Pfc. Tim Hines died July 14 of complications of injuries he suffered last month in a roadside bombing in Baghdad. His funeral was Friday.
On Saturday, someone pulled the flags out of the family’s yard, stuffed them under a car in the driveway and set the whole thing on fire. Firefighters doused the blaze and no one was injured, but the car was destroyed.
No arrests had been made by early Tuesday. Authorities offered a $5,000 reward for tips.
Neighbors bought the family new flags. “I went by later that morning, Saturday morning, and there must have been 200 flags that had been brought in and reposted,” Police Chief Mike Dickey said.
The car belonged to the sister-in-law of Hines.
All I can say is thank g-d for Fairfield neighbors - 200 flags is about right…
Hat tip: Van Helsing
Technical Difficulties
July 29, 2005
For those looking for the Kender radio show, stay tuned - he’s running a bit late today, but we will be on there. Sorry, folks. We’re waiting too. ;)
Join Us on The Radio Broadcast!
July 29, 2005
We will be discussing the Brother Against Brother series on Kender’s radio show again on Friday morning, 0800 PST (1100EST). We had a great hour-long conversation yesterday about the series, and how we got into it, and some of the highlights (and low points) of our research.
On Friday, Kender will open up the phone lines and we’ll be happy to take calls with questions or comments about the series.
Call 1-888-XRADIO1 after 0800PST (that’s 1000CST for me, and 1100EST for Kit). It’s 0500 now, so I’d better get some sleep - I don’t want to sleep through it!
Brother Against Brother: Chapter 8
July 29, 2005
Chapter 8, The Accusations, Part 2: More debunked accusations, this time aimed at Gary Linderer personally.
____________________________________
Written by Kit Jarrell and Heidi Thiess
It is important to note that the reason these authors investigated this story at all is because on June 3rd we were contacted by Don and Annette Hall, who were looking for military blogs to post their allegations against Gary Linderer. We were one of quite a few blogs that were sent the information. The refutation of their accusations comes after nearly two months of full-time research. We believe the results stand on their own.
1. Accusation: Don Hall states in an email dated 04/02/2003 and sent to Peter Schinkle of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (provided to us by the Halls):
“…Gary Linderer was never MACV Recondo School qualified. Gary arrived in Vietnam a Pfc. and left a Specialist Fourth Class. These guys, over the years, have had remarks and are jealous that I made Staff Sergeant (SSG) E-6 and was promoted by General Fred Weyand. I was the first young E-6 that the Army promoted at 19.”
We are in possession of Gary Linderer’s orders promoting him to E-4 on 3 November 1968, and E-5 on 10 February 1969. He had been scheduled to attend MACV Recondo School on November 23rd. Unfortunately, when it came time for him to attend the school, Linderer was in the hospital recovering from his multiple wounds after the battle on the hill. Hall has claimed that Linderer was not “jump qualified”, referring to him as a “leg”, a derogatory name for non-Airborne personnel. We are in possession of Linderer’s certificate stating he graduated from Airborne School in April of 1968.
2. Accusation: Don Hall casts doubt on the medals earned by Linderer, citing a Freedom of Information Act request that Hall filed to obtain copies of Linderer’s military records. In his request to the National Personnel Records Center, Hall listed the reason for his inquiry into another veteran’s records as “Research for a book and documentary about the unit in which this individual allegedly served. Need verification of service and awards.” He also used Linderer’s social security number on the form, which Linderer had not provided to him. It is not clear how Hall obtained this private information, and no such project to write a book or film a documentary on F/58th has yet been produced by the Halls in the nearly five years since.
The awards listing Hall received did not mention the two Purple Hearts Linderer claimed to have. Hall states that this proves he was never awarded them. Indeed, he ridicules the idea that a battle of any magnitude happened at all. From the Operation Homecoming email written by Annette Hall:
“He claims to have won 2 Purple Hearts for the wounds he suffered that day—one Purple Heart for a wound to one leg and another Purple Heart for a wound to his other leg. He explains winning two Silver Stars using the same type of reasoning, i.e., one as a result of the ambush by his team of the small group of “NVA and VC” and another for the battle they supposedly fought later that day with the 200+ NVA and VC. The records do not back up any of this. He has no Purple Hearts, for that day’s combat, or for any other combat wounds.”
The Halls not only question the authenticity of the medals Linderer claims to have received, they state that he is a “Purple Heart pretender and prevaricator extraordinaire”. In the same email to these authors Annette states:
I’d like to tell you a story about a man who is not so honorable, and who is making a living out of misrepresenting his war record in Vietnam. If Gary Linderer, the president and co-organizer of Operation Homecoming USA, is allowed to continue misleading people by faking his military record, he’ll give a bad example to our present-day military…”
Don Hall has said numerous times in emails and by phone to these authors that if in fact Gary Linderer was awarded two Purple Hearts for the same day’s combat then he is the first in Army history.
We are in possession of two Purple Heart certificates, dated 21 November 1968 and 15 December 1968. Both certificates are for “wounds received in action on 20 November 1968 in the Republic of Vietnam.” General Melvin Zais presented the first one to Gary Linderer on 21 November 1968 while he was in the hospital . The second was presented in a unit awards ceremony in March 1969. The LA Times ran a story about two Marines in Fallujah that are in line to receive multiple Purple Hearts for wounds received November 12, 2004. This is one of several examples we found. Linderer may not be the first to receive two Purple Hearts in one day, and he certainly isn’t the last.
3. Accusation: Linderer’s claim that he extended in the Army for 2 months so his wife could have their child at the end of his enlistment in 1970 is false. Hall claims that Linderer “doesn’t have a child that old and the Army does not allow extensions on enlistments. Period.”
On Linderer’s DD214, it states that he extended voluntarily for a two-month period. We are in possession of the birth certificate of Linderer’s son, who was born in October of 1970. Linderer was released from active duty two months later in December, 1970. [We did not post it due to the fact that it's personal information about someone who has nothing to do with this.]
The issue of medals and awards are a subject several times in Don Hall’s book, I Served. He describes an incident wherein his platoon leader stresses that he wants to see “more citations written up…I have yet to see any applications for Army medals. Half of you have been hit by shrapnel or have been burned by claymores out on patrols, but you have to go to the aid station and have the doctor record your wound. No matter how slight it is, it’s a Purple Heart.”
Upon his end of tour, Hall recalled his pride in his own citations: “I excitedly placed in their proper locations all my awarded ribbons and medals, some of which I had to purchase at the PX.” He then chewed out a hospital captain who “obviously intimidated by the uniform I was wearing, nervously glanced at the polished brass, ribbons, and citations.”
This is the list of citations, according to the U.S. Army, that each man holds.
Don Hall’s awards and citations:
National Defense Service Ribbon
Vietnam Service Medal
Parachute Badge
Combat Infantryman Badge
Bronze Star Medal w/ Device
Gary Linderer’s awards and citations:
Silver Star
Purple Heart (2)
Combat Infantryman Badge w/ 2 OS Bars
Bronze Star w/ Valor Device
Bronze Star
Vietnam Service Medal w/ 4 Bronze Service Stars
Vietnam Campaign Medal w/ Device
Army Commendation w/ Valor Device
Army Conduct w/ 1 Oak Leaf Cluster
Parachute Badge
Air Medal
Expert w/ M16
Sharpshooter w/ M14
National Defense Service Ribbon
Note: To date, Gary Linderer has never worn his awards or citations.
4. Accusation: In July of 1968, then-commanding officer of the F/58th, CPT Shepard, was injured outside his tent by a small explosion. The Halls allege Linderer stated under oath that if he knew who was responsible for what the Halls claim is a ‘fragging’, he would not reveal that information.
Annette states in her 4 July email to these authors:
It is NOT Don’s contention that Linderer is personally responsible for the fragging of Capt. Shepard. Linderer was CQ at the time of the incident, so he may, or may not, have had some negligence in it, but that doesn’t mean he was responsible for what happened. Don does not know if, and has never said, that Linderer was personally responsible. Don cannot say whether or not Linderer actually knew who did it. Only Linderer can answer that question. Don’s issue with Linderer is that Linderer says that even if he KNEW who did it, he wouldn’t tell, not even in a court of law.
Contrary to what Annette wrote, Don Hall himself stated on 2 February 2005 in an email to Larry Bailey, from Vietnam Vets For the Truth, that Linderer and his unit lied to the CID about their involvement.
You think fragging officer (planting a toe-popper mine in front of his tent), lying to the CID about it and getting away with it are good things?
Sp4 John Reid, a member of the F/58th, commented on this incident at Wizbang after Kevin Aylward posted the Halls’ accusations:
I reported into F-58th LRRPS right after that “incident” when the CID(Crimminal Investigation Division) was still conducting it’s [sic] investigation. It was never proved that it was a “fragging”. I defy Mr Hall to prove otherwise. The CO’s tent was off by itself, had a distinctive shape and was located close to the outer perimeter of Camp Eagle, the 101st base camp. The head of the division reconaissance unit would have made an attractive target for an enemy that did penetrate our defences [sic] and kill our personnel.
A few of the youngsters in our company did spread a rumour that the CO was fragged in order to create an image for themselves. Foolish in hindsight but not criminal. I would be interested to know if Cpt Shepard ever received a Purple Heart for his wounds. The only official action the US Army took was to order a heavy duty inner perimeter placed around the LRRP compound and order that no local civilian personnel were to be employed inside that wire. As I remember it the CID investigation revealed that the only personnel seen near the CO’s tent the day of the attack were Vietnamese civilian employees who may have placed the explosive.
The Halls insinuate that Linderer would not reveal the identity of those involved in the possible fragging incident even if under oath in court, and cite Linderer’s statement in a deposition conducted during a lawsuit that the Halls brought against Linderer in 2001. However, the actual quote from that deposition is somewhat different than the Halls’ portrayal.
Question [by Don Hall's attorney]: And no one found out who actually did this?
Answer [by Linderer]: No, and if I knew I wouldn’t tell you, but I don’t know. I have no idea.
The attorney went on to press Linderer, asking if he would report a fellow LRP who had committed a war crime. Linderer stated that it would be hard to do so in this hypothetical situation, and explained the closeness of the brotherhood between men who serve together in combat.
The Criminal Investigation Division (CID) interviewed everyone in the company and made no arrests, nor was any type of punishment recommended against any member of F/58th. In their report, the CID bureaucrats stated that in their opinion, “40% of the men in the company were psychotic. Another 40% of the men suffered from delusions of grandeur. The remainder were merely criminally insane.”
Linderer related in his book that the men of F/58th thought that was great. “My God, they did understand us! And we had thought that they just didn’t like us very much.”
Note: In Hall’s own book, I Served, he mentions ‘fragging’ officers several times, at one point thinking that “perhaps I was looking at the real enemy here.” “Finally, the fucking brass gets shot at. That’s what we need - more officeers getting shot at…” “‘Here’s the leader of this zoo! Fuck a bunch of generals!’ I said, patting the plastic barrel cover of my M-16….Fighting the urge to lift up my M-16 and spray [the generals'] tent with death…” He also describes with admiration a scene wherein the company is formed up to witness the physical beating of Major Zummo at the hands of their ‘Top’ [1st Sergeant]. CID also investigated his unit for an alleged ‘fragging’ wherein an officer was wounded.
5. Accusation: The Halls claim that Linderer and other men from the F/58th have threatened his life and the lives of his family. Hall calls these men “a bunch of punk thugs”, “goons”, and other terms.
While the men of F/58th are not happy about the accusations being made against them, there is no evidence to suggest that they have personally threatened Don Hall, Annette Hall, or the Halls’ daughter. The leads that the Halls offered us failed to yield any evidence, as the people they asked us to contact to prove their claims had only secondhand information from the Halls themselves. The Halls claimed to have audio and video proof of threats and threatening behavior that were made both by Linderer and members of a Special Forces unit that Hall claims he trained with in Vietnam. When asked for the taped telephone call in which the Halls claim they were threatened by the Special Forces soldier, the Halls sent us a blank audio tape. The other party on the phone call provided us with a copy of the complete call, which had been recorded by Don Hall without permission or notification. In the call, there are no threats made toward Don Hall or his family. [Note: In this phone call, Don Hall does mention that in the past he worked for the FBI and DEA. According to the other party, FBI records show that the only "Donald Hall" they had in their employ was in 1960, when Don Hall would have been 12 years old.]
The video of Linderer and his “thugs” intimidating and threatening Annette Hall physically was also never provided to us. The Halls claimed first that they had perhaps misplaced it and later claimed that one of their prior attorneys must have kept it. We attempted to contact the person who the Halls claimed shot the video but were unable to reach him. No one else we contacted on behalf of the Halls had knowledge of the video tape’s existence. However, multiple witnesses told us that the events described by the Halls did not occur.
In all actuality, the only threats that we were able to uncover between Don Hall and F/58th members were made by Don Hall himself. These threats are listed in email after email, in varying tones and levels of severity.
In an email to Gary Linderer on 7 February 2005: “You have bumped heads with a man the likes of which you have never met in your entire life, fatso…I will pick the time and the place and you…. Well, you’ll see. How’s Barbara and your only son?” Linderer replied, “Thanks, Donald.” Hall’s next email stated “Heading your way, fatso.”
To Gary Linderer on February 4, 2005: “We’ll see exactly how brave a fat man you are — real soon fatso.”
In an email to Ed Emanuel, a member of Hall’s own unit who has come under fire for both supporting Linderer and for other issues arising with the Halls, yesterday on 28 July 2005: “Hey fat Black guy! Check it out: www.f58lrp.com You didn’t show up in court today? Are you still hiding? Are you afraid to give me your address? I’ll come to your address if you do…”
In another email to Ed Emanuel, dated June 26, 2005: “You are going to round that corner one day to check on your mail or heading to your golf course and I’m going to step in front of you. You have two quick decisions to make. Run way which I know you will or stand there and take it.”
In an email to Joe Chiarella, a retired Special Forces medic recently returned from Iraq, on February 9, 2005: “You got a wife, Joe? You have a daughter, Joe? Where are they at? I have some PTSD friends that I could “share†your wife’s name with who would like to call them.” Hall goes on to say, “Who is you [sic] Company Commander? Who is [sic] Battalion Commander and their phone numbers, please? Where are you stationed and what is your phone number? Joe, you are in the Army so, LET’S ROLL, KIDDOl[sic]”
We are in possession of hundreds of emails from the last 9 years that are much like this. Hall uses racial slurs such as “spearchucker”, “spic”, and more when referring to his fellow vets. In the above email, Hall references www.f58lrp.com, which Annette purchased in February of 2002 and holds until 2006. Anyone visiting a site that, from its domain name, would be expected to be about F/58th LRP, 101st Airborne Division may be surprised to find that the entire site is dedicated to the Halls’ accusations about Gary Linderer and the other brave men who served in his unit.
Other Inconsistencies
1. The Halls sent us an email that they claimed was from Kenn Miller, a member of F/58th who was on SSG Burnell’s team during the battle of 20 November 1968. In it, Kenn appears to be bragging about “hacking” into another person’s computer. The Halls claimed that this showed what kind of people Linderer associated with.
—–Original Message—–
From: Kenn Miller [mailto:xxxx@earthlink.net]
Sent: Tuesday, June 8, 2003 01:57 AM
To: Don C. Hall
Subject: computers
Cc:Donny Boy,
We know what the men in your own unit are talking about. We hacked into your
rep. Bob Edward’s home computer. That’s right— Donny Boy.We know all that is going on and what you are writing.
We have the complete low-down on your pathetic and reckless ways.
You’re a dumb bunch of computer illiterates. They don’t have a skirt
to hide behind like you. Must be nice for— a skirt to set your computer with a firewall
but we’ll get into that. On our list—- Donny Boy.Clueless in Seattle. Your own men don’t like you.
[...]
You will never get any book deal, and that’s fact.You and your skirt are– BLACKLISTED.
Kenn
Readers are asked to note that June 8, 2003, the date listed on the email that Kenn Miller allegedly sent, was a Sunday, not a Tuesday. This was apparently an oversight on the part of whoever created the email.
2. The Halls claim on Wizbang that they contacted the commanding officer of the 101st Airborne Division, General Melvin Zais. From their comment on Wizbang:
Don tried to get him to answer some questions a few years ago, but he refused to cooperate. When Don tried to contact him again, the phone number had been disconnected.
These authors suggest that the reason General Zais “refused to cooperate” is because he had been dead for over two decades, having passed away due to cancer in the late 1970s.
3. In the email to Operation Homecoming personnel in 2005, Annette Hall claims that she and her husband support the event.
A welcome-home event for Vietnam veterans is a wonderful idea (my husband Don was a combat soldier in Vietnam from 1967-68), but if one of the main organizers has a background that if brought to the public eye would bring extremely negative attention on the event as a whole, and by association, on the Operation Homecoming organization, on its board of directors, on its entertainers and celebrities, and on the Branson community as a whole, I think they are entitled to that information.
However, in the February 7 email to Linderer, Don Hall has a different perspective where he mentions the city of Branson, MO as a potential target for a lawsuit:
Think what I could do to you and everyone connected to you? The City of Branson, Wishcamper and all his old law firm buddies and current ones, your fellow authors, Random House and I am not going to let you know who else, but they’re not going to be all too happy with you when they get the papers. You want to go that route? Knock yourself out because that’s what I want you to do. If we could pay out a half million bucks for a documentary and still live very comfortable think what I could do to you if I wanted too. Branson and the E&E insurance would pay me well, plus my attorney fees and the PR we’d get from it all. I want you to sue me. PLEASE DO!
There are several other instances like this which we have omitted for the sake of brevity.
During his ongoing email campaign against Gary Linderer in 2003, a Gold Star Mother Advocate chided Don Hall for his accusations against Gary Linderer and the men of the 75th Ranger Regiment Association:
“You sir came back from your war. My son and many others did not. It is not the number of kills or medals that are the value of real Rangers. Their legacies are so much more than that. Be grateful for what you have and find a way to be of better service to yourself and others. What you are doing now is not something to be proud of.”
We leave you with the following quotes from the Halls:
Don Hall: “I kick ass with the facts and the documentation.”
Annette Hall: “Read the documentation about Mr. Linderer and decide for yourself who is telling the truth.”
Indeed.
________________________________________________
Quick Links:
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Ambush in the Ruong Ruong
Chapter 3: Nowhere To Go
Chapter 4: The Absence of All Hope
Chapter 5: To Save Our Brothers
Chapter 6: The Legacy of 20 November 1968
Chapter 7: The Accusations, Pt. 1
Chapter 8: The Accusations, Pt. 2
Chapter 9: The Present-Day War
Chapter 10: Hope For Future Peace
UPDATED: Brother Against Brother: Don & Annette Halls’ Rebuttal
Our Final Word.
Neverending…
Books authored by the men of the Brother Against Brother series
Next: Why would a fellow LRP bring accusations of murder and falsehood against his brothers? Why would someone wish to threaten not just the heroes of F/58th, but anyone who supports them? We have the answer. Coming Monday.
Brother Against Brother: Chapter 7
July 28, 2005
Chapter 7: The Accusations, Part 1 - After the hell endured by the men of Team 24 in the Ruong Ruong Valley, they have come under fire by a fellow veteran and his wife who say the men have engaged in a cover-up of what really happened: the murder of unarmed rice carriers.
________________________________________
Written by Kit Jarrell and Heidi Thiess
In June of 2005, Operation Homecoming USA took place in Branson, MO. It was the homecoming event that Vietnam veterans all over America had never gotten. Parades, air shows, a golf tournament, and a week of simply being in the company of others who had shared the same experiences. For thousands of veterans it was healing that had taken almost 40 years to come.
Financed partly by multi-millionaire and former Presidential candidate Ross Perot, Operation Homecoming USA was the brainchild of Gary Linderer. He had lived out of a suitcase for two years, shuttling back and forth between his home south of St. Louis and the event site in Branson. Linderer’s wife quit her job and took a position helping Linderer work on his vision. The event took shape and promised to be something incredible for tens of thousands of Vietnam veterans who deserved to be honored as heroes. However, a shadow would fall on the event in the form of accusations against Linderer, all having to do with one day long ago on a Vietnam trail.
On February 15, 2005 an email went out to “Operation Homecoming USA board members, entertainers and celebrities appearing at the event, the media, Internet sites, and to various veterans,â€1 stating that the men of Team 24, and Gary Linderer specifically, had targeted unarmed female rice porters in their ambush instead of the NVA nurses and staff officer that the team claimed. The email to the above addresses pertaining to Operation Homecoming had been written by Annette Hall, the wife of Vietnam veteran Donald C. Hall. Don Hall had served as a team leader with F/51st, another Long Range Patrol unit that operated near Saigon, almost 650 miles south of Camp Eagle and Team 24’s ill-fated mission.
The email, later posted on the Halls’ website, outlined the Halls’ strong belief that Linderer and Team 24 had purposefully targeted unarmed female rice porters after letting 30 Viet Cong go past them throughout the night. According to the Halls, Team 24 was afraid of the dark and did not want to engage the enemy. Although the people involved with Operation Homecoming had not heard anything of these accusations before, to Linderer and his fellow LRPs, this was just another attack by the Halls; one of many in the last 9 years.
The Halls cite an Army document called a DA-1594 as proof of their claims, which is a Duty Officer’s Radio Log that ideally chronicles a summary of the radio traffic reported to division level. The Halls believe that the 1594s refute the version of November 20th told by the survivors and expose a cover-up by the LRP team.
The next few articles in our series will deal with some of the accusations one by one.
a. The Ambush
1. Allegation: The Halls believe that the mission of Team 24 was not to find an enemy base camp, but to kill 30 VC that had been “terrorizing†a “nearby village.†From the Operation Homecoming email, Annette Hall stated: “The 101st Airborne Division sent out two 12-man Long Range Patrol ‘heavy teams’ to locate and ambush the 30 VC.”
Also from the Halls’ website:
The ambush of the small group of “armed” “NVA staff officers and nurses” on the morning of 20 November 1968 was actually an ambush in broad daylight on a group of unarmed female rice porters from a nearby village, all of whom were killed, though according to their books, one of the women took awhile to die. The night before, according to their books, Linderer and the rest of the 12-main[sic] “heavy team” of Lurps (LRPs) of which he was a part, had let the 30 VC who had been their primary objective go by unmolested. Instead, the next day, Linderer’s 12-man team ambushed the rice-carrying women.
The Halls claim Page 2 of the 1594 log for 20 November 1968, entered at 10:00 am, confirms this as the mission objective.
“G2 recd msg fr 1st Bde[1st Brigade] stating: At 2400 [midnight] to 0400H vic [in the vicinity of] An Nong 1 YD 918093 & An Nong 3 YD 933106 in Loc Bon village[village name and coordinates], info came from village chief to A Co [Alpha Company] that 30 VC [Viet Cong] last night came through loc [location] above. Primary purpose was to collect money, but would accept rice instead. They came fr [from] south and returned south.â€
The first notable point is the time. According to the entry above, chiefs from the village of Loc Bon had come to the 1st Brigade to complain that some “VC” soldiers had visited their village “last night” demanding money or rice. Team 24’s mission, as relayed to them on the 18th, was to find the large enemy forces in the area and there is no record anywhere of their mission being altered after insertion. They received the warning order for their mission on November 18th and were inserted on the early evening of the 19th. At midnight on 20 November 1968, Team 24 had already been laying in the jungle with an injured Sgt John Sours for over 6 hours between two large forces of NVA.
According to our research, these villages were also not located near the ambush site. Without exception, every veteran we spoke with who worked in that area (both from F/58th and other unrelated units) stated that there were no villages left. U.S. Army maps confirm that all villages in the Ruong Ruong Valley at that time had been long since abandoned and moved to the east side of Highway 1, a major thoroughfare. The coordinates of the village in question are 22 kilometers north and 10 kilometers west from the place where Team 24 ambushed the enemy. In order for the rice carrying detail mentioned above to have encountered the LRPs in the jungle, they would have had to travel approximately 27 kilometers on foot in half a day’s time through craggy and mountainous terrain in a straight line.
Another notable point is that these villages were only 4 kilometers east southeast of Camp Eagle in the rear. The Halls do not explain why 2d Brigade would send twelve men 27 kilometers away to deal with a problem that was only 4 kilometers away. The team was also inserted to the southwest; in the opposite direction.
The message in the 1594 also came from 1st Brigade, which was not the Brigade that F/58th was attached to. The LRPs of F/58th, though part of the 101st Airborne Division, came under the operational control (OPCON) of the 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry. According to the report, the village chiefs spoke with someone from Alpha Company within the 1st Brigade. The LRPs of Team 24 were from Foxtrot Company, 58th Infantry, under the 2d Brigade.
2. Allegation: The reason Team 24 did not blow their ambush is because they were afraid of the NVA and the dark.
Although there is nothing in the 1594s to support this particular contention, several emails and notes written by the Halls offer reasons why Team 24 did not engage the enemy during the night. The reasons range from outright cowardice to the fact that Contreros was due to go home soon.
SGT Alberto Contreros was, by all accounts, an excellent soldier. He was an honor graduate of both MACV Recondo School and stateside Recondo School. More importantly, he was described by his commanding officer and fellow soldiers as “boldâ€, “gung-ho†and “motivated†In fact, some describe him as “medal-hungryâ€. Originally from Cuba, Contreros’ dream was to return to his former homeland and liberate it from Fidel Castro, according to the men who served with him. Several veterans have told us that Contreros was one of two people in the unit (the other being SSG Richard Burnell) who seemed to enjoy combat. There is no evidence, written or otherwise, to suggest that Contreros would have shirked his duty to engage if the situation had been conducive, and as the Team Leader, it was Contreros’ call to engage.
However, Team 24 had been inserted into an area that was literally crawling with NVA. There were 12 soldiers on the team and Sours was already injured. The NVA were aware the team was on the ground and sent small units down the trail followed by larger ones in an attempt to draw the team into an ambush they could not get out of. To the team, engaging a much larger force at night with a member of the team unable to walk was not a prudent course of action. The ambush was blown soon after Sours was extracted the next morning.
3. Allegation:
From an email to these authors from Annette Hall dated 4 July 2005:
[Don] believes the 5 female and 4 male rice porters that the team ambushed on 20 November were young villagers transporting rice to the VC to fulfill the demands made by the group of VC who had been terrorizing the local villages demanding rice and/or money. He cannot say absolutely whether or not there were VC or NVA in the group or not.
According to every single veteran we spoke with, the entire area that the LRPs worked in was occupied by North Vietnamese Army regulars, not the Viet Cong troops that could be found in the southern provinces. In late 1968, after the Tet Offensive the NVA troops had literally poured in through the North Vietnam border according to military intelligence. Of the many veterans from different units that we spoke to unrelated to F/58th, such as the Delta Raiders that operated out of LZ Sally, they all state emphatically that they never saw or engaged a VC soldier in their entire time in the field.
“In my whole year over there, I never fought VC,†said Gene Robertson, a platoon sergeant with the 2nd platoon, Delta Company, 501st Airborne. “I fought NVA.â€
According to the U.S. Army at the time, the area west and south of the city of Hue extending all the way to the Laotian border and north to the North Vietnam border was a free-fire zone. This vast area was home to thousands of NVA soldiers who moved frequently between mobile base camps. A free-fire zone meant that there were no friendly forces in the area; including civilians or innocent villagers. Anyone encountered by LRP teams in the area were legitimate enemy targets.
“The entire AO (area of operations) was a hostile area,†said Chuck Leshikar, platoon leader for the 3rd Platoon. “There was no civilization within 9 miles; no civilians and no villages.â€
Jerry Head, another member of 2nd Platoon, agrees. “Even if they were women, they had no business being on that trail. I’d have shot them.â€
According to members of Special Forces units unrelated to B-36 or F/58th that we consulted, as well as sources knowledgeable on Vietnam and its history, actual “rice porters†in northern South Vietnam traveled in groups of 20-50 and were usually accompanied by an equal-sized group of ammunition porters. Rice porters carried 50 pound bags of rice or the metric equivalent and were slow moving. They were heavily guarded by NVA troops who went along with them as security. A standard ratio was 30-40 porters for 70-100 NVA troops. According to the 1594s for Nov 23, the 1st platoon of D/501 found only 20 pounds of rice in a tube at the ambush site; assumed to be daily rations for the medical team the men ambushed. This confirms what the men of Team 24 remember seeing on the bodies.
3. Accusation: The .45-caliber pistols found on the females were “in all probability†planted by the team, and were in actuality the weapons carried by the two M-60 gunners and their assistants.
From a taped conversation between Don Hall and these authors dated 3 Jun 05:
Don Hall: Now, if you’re on an ambush in a LRP team, on the flanks of the ambush, you have 2 M60 machine guns that cover the flanks and the M60 machine gunner and his assistant who carries ammo for him. That’s a total of 4 .45 pistols that the Americans setting up the ambush carried. The VC normally carried the North Vietnamese, Chinese 9mm pistols most of the time.
Heidi Thiess: Are you implying that there were no weapons captured?
Don Hall: More than likely, yes.
Hall’s belief that the 45s came from the M-60 gunners and their assistants is apparently a new speculation that has evolved over the last three years. In an email dated 8 June 2003 and sent to 37 people within the veteran community, Hall derides the LRP team for not having one.
“Keep in mind, that this team DID NOT have even one M-60 machinegun in support of themselves on this date of 20 Nov. 1968 as they claim,” Hall writes. “RED FLAG, RIGHT?”
In Don’s own book, I Served, on pg. 124, he states that “the M16, while a good weapon, is not suitable to LRRP operations as is the CAR-15 because it is too long and catches in the brush.†The M16 was approximately 9 lbs, and 40†long – the M60 was 23 lbs and 44†long – a significantly larger weapon. The ammo came in 250 and 500 round belts, and were significantly heavier also. The M60 gunner usually had at least one, possibly two assistants, also carrying heavy belts of extra ammo. Two M60s would eat up six personnel – on a small, fast, moving LRP team, in difficult mountain/jungle terrain - unwieldy, unlikely and more trouble than it was worth.
As Hall was evidently aware at the time, the LRPs of F/58th rarely if ever took M60s on missions and did not have one on the mission of 20 Nov 1968. The mountainous and wild jungle terrain did not provide the required fields of fire for a weapon of that weight and power and were incredibly hard to carry in that type of situation. F/58th personnel also did not carry .45-caliber pistols at all. The unit only had one and it was assigned to the payroll officer, according to one veteran of F/58th.
Three of the four females in the ambushed party carried .45-caliber pistols. One of these females had her firearm concealed in her rucksack along with her medical supplies. CPT Eklund stated that there was an intelligence report of a field hospital in the vicinity.
In an email to the authors dated 4 July 05, Annette Hall explains her theory that the party ambushed was not a threat to the team.
Don cannot say whether or not there were any actual VC or NVA with the rice-porter detail, but even if there were, he says that since the group was made up of five females (according to the DA1594) and the group carried only two .45 caliber pistols (according to the DA1594), they offered little actual threat to a heavy team of 12 fully armed Lurps waiting in ambush. And, it was broad daylight, so the team should have been able to see what visible arms the group of rice porters was carrying and what sort of threat, if any, they presented. If no weapons were visible, why did they blow the ambush? Even if two of the group had been brandishing their 45’s, would that have made them so formidable that the Lurps’ first action would have been to blow all their claymores on the group? Linderer says in his books that one of the 45’s was found in the bottom of one of the female’s rucksacks. How much of a legitimate threat could they have possibly been?
According to our research, the ‘assessment of threat’ was a foregone conclusion by the U.S. Army, who had ruled the entire area a free-fire zone. In a phone call on 21 July, Hall stated to these authors that “a braver man would have stepped on that trail and taken those people prisoner instead of just blowing claymores on them.” The Halls’ contention that Team 24 blew an ambush instead of taking the party prisoner to “ascertain what kind of threat they actually posed†demonstrates a misunderstanding of the mission of a hunter/killer team.
This photo of the ambush site was provided to us by Jerry Head, a member of the 2nd Platoon, D/501. His unit was inserted in this area on the basis of the intel Team 24 had recovered in their ambush. Out of respect for the dead, we have blurred the bodies of the enemy soldiers caught in the LRPs claymore mines.
The unnamed soldier from D/501 is standing at the break of the trail, and to the soldier’s left is the ridgeline. The bodies are laid out in a row down the trail. To the right and above the trail are the ambush positions where the team laid no more than 10 feet from the enemy soldiers as they passed. Further right is the knoll where they fought for their lives.
4. Accusation: The team sat around for over an hour trying to decide how to explain that they just killed unarmed rice porters.
The Halls claim that the hour spent at the ambush site was for the purpose of creating a cover story that would explain the LRPs apparent murder of unarmed civilians. As evidenced above, those killed were not civilians but rather NVA, they were armed and the area was a free-fire zone.
According to CPT Eklund, their commanding officer, the men remained in the area to wait for a chopper that would bring a reaction force. The team was instructed to meet the reaction force and board the choppers where they would be re-armed and reinserted in Burnell’s area of operations five klicks away. Team 24 had one LZ and could not move far. No cover-up story was necessary because the LRPs had executed their mission as a hunter/killer team.
In Hall’s own book, I Served, he describes a mission in Chapter 14 wherein a LRP Team 24 (and the CO was “Sixâ€, just like F/58th’s Team) was spotted by an enemy soldier “about 9 or 10 years old†who came with 2 feet of the team and escaped unharmed. They knew the Team was in trouble because the enemy would report their position and draw the VC “like flies looking for a turdâ€. Indeed, in Don’s version of events, Team 24 did not quickly move off site, but instead set up a “tight perimeter†and was eventually surrounded by “what was estimated to be an NVA companyâ€. He describes a 2-hour firefight, incoming artillery, claymores blown on “gooks†and the eventual successful extraction of Team 24. Hall does not say whether the threat was “properly ascertained” or if the taking of prisoners was considered.
Back in the rear, when asked by Maj Maus, F/51st’s commander, why the Team didn’t move to the LZ after being compromised , the team leader said he†didn’t want to lead them to the landing zone and be caught waiting for the slicksâ€. “Excellent decision,” Major Maus acknowledged. The situations seem quite similar, but for whatever reason, the actions of F/58th’s Team 24 are worthy of ridicule and the actions of Hall’s own team are not.
5. Accusation: One of the females “took a while to dieâ€.
The Halls cite the 1594, page 2, item 17, which states in part:
8 VC were killed outright, one was captured but was seriously wounded. This VC later died after attempt to evac him was made. No friendly cas.
The female that survived the initial claymore blast was horrifically wounded. She died within 3 minutes. There was no attempt to evacuate this female according to CPT Eklund.
The Halls claim that the 1594s are a perfect and accurate account of all action within the division. However, in one of the many errors, the 1594 gives the gender of this NVA soldier as male. In this instance, the Halls themselves disagree with what the 1594 says. In Annette Hall’s email, she says the wounded soldier was female.
6. Accusation: Linderer blew his claymore without the team leader’s signal.
In the 4 July email, Annette Hall writes:
Don believes that Gary Linderer blew his claymore, thus initiating the ambush, and did so without the team leader’s signal. Don believes that Linderer blew his claymore as soon as the rice porters came into view, without first giving the team leader the chance to ascertain just what kind of actual threat the group of rice porters presented to the fully loaded 12-man Lurp team, and whether or not they were a valid target. In Don’s LRP outfit, the team leader was the one who was authorized to initiate an ambush, not team members, not unless the team leader was dead. If he were dead, then then[sic] assistant team leader would take over command decisions. It was always the team leader who popped the first claymore and the team followed suit.
In all the documentation provided by the Halls, there was no evidence that confirmed that Linderer blew his claymore without a signal by the team leader. In our research, we found that in this case the team leader gave a predetermined signal by snapping his fingers. Upon this signal, all members of the team blew their claymores at the same time. This was confirmed by Riley Cox, Gary Linderer and other members of Team 24.
7. Accusation: Team 24 did not at any time during the day, engage a force larger than a reinforced enemy squad.
As previously noted in Don’s Book, Chapter 14, it is most likely that a large number of NVA are drawn to a compromised team. It is highly improbable, with as many NVA units as were reported in this area, the ambush would go unnoted except by a small squad.
Note: It is unlikely that 6 pairs of F-4 Phantoms flew multiple sorties, and at least that many Cobras spent six hours bombing and strafing the area for only one “squad†of NVA. Everyone at and over the battlesite could see that there were hundreds (CPT Eklund estimated considerably more) of NVA soldiers that had converged on the battle zone. All eyewitness accounts, both from the ground and the air support the estimate of a battalion-sized enemy force.
CPT Ken Eklund, Commander, F/58th: “Intel indicated there were two regiments and one sapper battalion in this direct vicinity. There were approximately 15,000-20,000 ‘gooks’ in the Ruong Ruong/Ashau area.â€
SP4 Tony Tercero, leader of the reaction force: “More ‘gooks’ than I ha



